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IMMINENT CHANGE: A RECOMMENDED RESPONSE FOR 
MISSOURI IN THE WAKE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S EMINENT 
DOMAIN DECISION IN KELO v. CITY OF NEW LONDON 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“A man’s home is his castle,”1 but not if his municipality wants to build a 
Wal-Mart.  An individual’s home holds a unique place in United States 
jurisprudence.2  It is protected from a myriad of intrusions,3 but it appears it is 
not protected from the almighty dollar.  The power of eminent domain is 
granted to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment and to local 
state governments through their own respective constitutional provisions.4  In 
particular, the Fifth Amendment establishes that an individual’s private 
property will not be taken from him and put to public use unless just 
compensation is paid.5  The Takings Clause is a very small notation in our 
Constitution, but recently its interpretation has sparked enormous scholarly 
 
 1. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 229 (1981). 
 2. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (“[N]either history nor this Nation’s 
experience requires us to disregard overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been 
embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (home is protected from thermal 
imaging); Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (home is protected from residential picketing); 
FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (home is proteced from the broadcast media). 
 4. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 24; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17; 
ARK CONST. art. II, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; COL. CONST. art. II, §§ 14-15; CONN. CONST. 
art. I, § 11; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6; GA. CONST. art. I, § 3, P 1; HAW. 
CONST. art. I, § 20; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 14; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15; IND. CONST. art. I, § 21; 
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18; KAN. Const. art. XII, § 4; KY. CONST. § 13; LA. CONST. art. I § 4; ME. 
CONST. art. I, § 21; MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 40-40A; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X; MICH. CONST. 
art. X, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13; MISS. CONSt. art. III, § 17; MO. CONST. art. I, §§ 26-28; 
MONT. CONST. art. II § 29; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 21; Nev. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, 
art. 12; N.J. CONST. art. I, P 20; N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 20; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7; N.C. CONST. 
art. I, § 19; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19; OKLA. CONST. art. II, §§ 23-24; 
OR. CONST. art. I, § 18; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13; 
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 13; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 21; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17; UTAH CONST. art. 
I, § 22; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 2; VA. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 11; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16; W. VA. 
CONST. art. III, § 9; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 13; WYO. CONST. art. I, §§ 32-33. 
 5. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). That Clause is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
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debate throughout the country.6  At the center of this debate is the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London.7  The 5-4 opinion held that 
New London’s decision to use eminent domain to take property for the purpose 
of economic development did indeed satisfy the public use requirement of the 
Fifth Amendment.8  At first glance, the decision seems to be utterly 
inconsistent with the text of the Constitution, but upon further investigation the 
holding is merely the final result of a natural progression of years of decisions 
which have gradually eroded individual property rights through eminent 
domain. 
Despite the defeat of individual property rights advocates in this particular 
case, the Supreme Court noted that individual states had the ability to limit or 
restrict eminent domain powers as they wished.9  As a result, the Kelo decision 
has placed the eminent domain controversy at the forefront of political debate 
in numerous state legislatures across the country, including Missouri, because 
at the moment it appears all property is subject to eminent domain so long as 
the proposed “new use” creates general economic benefits for the city.10  
Currently Alabama, Delaware, Texas, and Ohio have enacted legislation which 
restricts the government’s ability to exercise its eminent domain power.11  This 
comment will examine the legislation of those states that have restricted the 
government’s taking power and also examine the possible actions the Missouri 
General Assembly could take in response to the Kelo decision.  As of this time 
of this writing, Missouri has not enacted legislation to restrict eminent domain 
powers.  Action must be taken in order to preserve its citizens’ property rights 
and to limit the scope of eminent domain powers. 
A. The Kelo Case 
The controversy in this case centers on the town of New London, 
Connecticut.12  The city was designated a “distressed municipality” in 1990.13  
The Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed 1,500 people in the 
 
 6. See, e.g., Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving 
“Public Use” as a Limitation on the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New 
London, 54 DRAKE L. R. 171 (2005). 
 7. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct 2655 (2005). 
 8. Id. at 2665. 
 9. Id. at 2668. 
 10. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Eminent Domain-2005 State Legislation, 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/post-keloleg.htm (last visited June 11, 2006) (a web site 
dedicated to keeping track of all eminent domain legislation introduced across the United States 
after the Kelo decision) [hereinafter National Conference]; see also Furhmeister, supra note 6, at 
178. 
 11. See ALA CODE § 11-47-170; DEL CODE ANN TIT. 29, § 9505 (2005); S.B. 167, 126th 
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (Vernon 2005). 
 12. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658. 
 13. Id. 
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town, was closed by the federal government in 1996, and in 1998 the city’s 
unemployment rate became double the average of the rest of the state.14  In 
order to aid the struggling community, state officials sought the help of a 
private, the New London Development Corporation (“NLDC”), nonprofit 
group, to develop an economic revitalization plan for the community.15  To 
assist the NLDC, the state legislature approved the issuance of bonds totaling 
around fifteen million dollars in January of 1998.16  One month later, Pfizer, 
Inc. announced plans for a three hundred million dollar research center in the 
community which local officials hoped would jumpstart the area’s 
resurgence.17 
The NLDC continued to develop its revitalization plans, and submitted 
their formal plans to the appropriate state agencies for approval.18  The final 
plan involved ninety acres in the Fort Trumbull area of the city.19  The 
development plan contained seven parcels which were made up of around 115 
privately owned properties, and thirty-two acres of the previously closed Navy 
base.20  Each parcel was individually designated for a specific development, 
and the NLDC hoped this would attract new commerce to the community.21  
The city council approved the final plan, and according to state statute, chose 
the NLDC as the development agent.22  The NLDC had the ability to purchase 
all the private property required in the plan or to use the city’s eminent domain 
power.23  The NLDC purchased all but fifteen of the properties.24  As a result, 
condemnation proceedings were brought against the owners of the fifteen 
properties, and the owners subsequently filed an action claiming these 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 2659. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. The development plan involved seven individual parcels.  Parcel 1 was designated for 
a conference hotel in the center of a “small urban village” which was comprised of restaurants 
and shopping.  Parcel 2 was to be the site of eighty new residential properties connected by a 
walkway to the rest of the development.  Parcel 3 was to contain about 90,000 square feet of 
research and development office space.  Parcel 4A contained 2.4 acres and it was to be used to 
support the state park or the marina by providing parking and retail facilities.  Parcel 4B included 
the marina and the last stretch of the river walk.  Parcels 5, 6, and 7, provided additional land for 
future development of offices, retail stores, parking, or marine commercial uses. Id. 
 22. “Any municipality which has a planning commission is authorized, by vote of its 
legislative body, to designate the economic development commission or the redevelopment 
agency of such municipality or a nonprofit development corporation as its development agency 
and exercise through such agency the powers granted under this chapter . . . .” CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 8-188 (2005). 
 23. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. 
 24. Id. 
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attempted takings were in violation of the Fifth Amendment because these 
properties were not designated as blighted, and the condemnation actions arose 
solely because of their location in the development plan.25 
In December of 2000, the case was heard in the New London Superior 
Court.26  The court approved half of the takings, and held the other half 
unconstitutional, causing both parties to appeal the decision to the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut.27  The Connecticut Supreme Court approved all of the 
takings, reasoning that they were valid under the state’s municipal 
development statute.28  The Connecticut Supreme Court also held that 
economic development was a public use.29  This decision was appealed, and 
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide if the power of eminent 
domain allowed a state to take private property for economic development 
under the Fifth Amendment.30 
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 
decision, holding that the city’s exercise of eminent domain power with the 
goal of economic development was constitutional under the Fifth 
Amendment.31  While this decision is troubling to individual property rights 
advocates because it seemingly broadens the scope of the state’s eminent 
domain powers, Kelo was the result of the proper application of years of legal 
precedent.  The problem with Kelo is not the holding itself, but rather with the 
likely effects of the holding.  All property is now theoretically subject to 
eminent domain proceedings if restrictive eminent domain legislation is not 
enacted.  This note examines recent history of eminent domain decisions by the 
Supreme Court before Kelo, individual state reactions to the Kelo decision, and 
suggests the direction Missouri should take so that its legislature can enact 
meaningful legislation which would establish boundaries for the exercise of 
eminent domain. 
 
 25. Nine petitioners filed a claim under the Fifth Amendment.  Four of the remaining fifteen 
properties were in Parcel 3 and eleven were Parcel 4A.  The owners occupied ten of the parcels, 
while five were held as investment properties. Id. at 2660. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id.  Properties in Parcel 4A were granted a permanent restraining order. Id. 
 28. The development statute states: 
[P]ermitting and assisting municipalities to acquire and improve unified land and water 
areas and to acquire and improve or demolish vacated commercial plants for industrial 
and business purposes and, in distressed municipalities, to lend funds to businesses and 
industries within a project area in accordance with such planning objectives are public 
uses and purposes for which public moneys may be expended; and that the necessity in 
the public interest for the provisions of this chapter is hereby declared as a matter of 
legislative determination. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-186 (2005). 
 29. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. 
 30. Id. at 2661. 
 31. Id. at 2665. 
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II.  HISTORY 
The Kelo decision hinged on whether a city’s plan for economic 
development was a public purpose under the Fifth Amendment.32  The 
Supreme Court has previously recognized three different categories of takings 
which have been held to meet the constitutional requirement of the Takings 
Clause.33 
A. Three Recognized Constitutional Takings through the Eminent Domain 
Power 
Two of three categories are relatively simple.34  The first category is where 
the state or federal government exercises its eminent domain power to transfer 
individual private property to the general public.35  Different examples of this 
category include situations where a government takes private land and converts 
it into “a road, a hospital, or a military base.”36  A second category of takings 
allows the state to take private property and pass it to private parties.37  These 
private parties, however, must develop the land for use by the public.38  
Specific examples of this eminent domain power include “a railroad, a public 
utility, or a stadium.”39 
A third category has developed because not every situation can be easily 
placed into the previous categories.40  The two categories are simply too 
narrow to encompass the entire reach of the Takings Clause.41  As a result, the 
Supreme Court has ruled takings constitutional where the taking eventually 
serves a public purpose even though the property will be for private use.42 
This third category began to develop in 1954 in Berman v. Parker,43 where 
the Supreme Court upheld a plan which designated a blighted area in 
Washington, D.C. for redevelopment.44  The targeted area had about 5,000 
residents, and most of their housing was not repairable.45  The plan proposed 
 
 32. Id. at 2663 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 36. See, e.g., Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55 (1925); Rindge Co. v. 
County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923). 
 37. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992); 
Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916). 
 40. Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 
(1954). 
 43. Berman, 348 U.S. 26. 
 44. Id. at 29. 
 45. Id. 
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condemning the area and constructing public facilities.46  Any remaining land 
could be sold to private parties for other purposes, such as low-cost housing.47 
A department store owner challenged the condemnation plan because his 
store was in good repair.48  He argued that the proposed governmental goal of 
a “better balanced, more attractive community” did not satisfy the public use 
requirement of the Fifth Amendment.49  The Court rejected this argument and 
upheld the taking, reasoning that community development programs cannot be 
examined on an individual basis.50  The Court also gave great deference to the 
decisions made by the legislature in determining which development projects a 
community chose to implement.51 
Thirty years later in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,52 the Supreme 
Court was once again confronted with the question of whether a public purpose 
taking can be constitutional under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.53  A land condemnation plan was challenged where title was 
taken away from lessors and given to lessees.54  The Hawaiian government 
developed the plan in order to increase the number of owners of real 
property.55  At the time of the plan a majority of the state’s land was in control 
of the state government, federal government, and seventy-two private 
landowners.56  The legislature determined that the concentration of land 
ownership was “skewing the State’s residential fees simple market, inflating 
land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and welfare.”57 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Berman, 348 U.S. at 29. 
 50. Id. at 35 (“If owner after owner were permitted to resist these redevelopment programs 
on the ground that his particular property was not being used against the public interest, 
integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly.”). 
 51. Id. at 33 (“We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not 
desirable.  The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The values it represents 
are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.  It is within the power of the 
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as 
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.  In the present case, the Congress and 
its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values.  
It is not for us to reappraise them.  If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the 
Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment 
that stands in the way.”). 
 52. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 230. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 232. The state and the federal government owned about forty-nine percent of 
the state’s land, while another forty-seven percent was owned by a group of seventy-two private 
citizens. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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In Midkiff, just as in Berman, the Court upheld the taking and transfer of 
the land by power of eminent domain.58  Once again the Court gave great 
deference to the legislature’s developmental determination.59  The Supreme 
Court held that a state’s wish to diminish the “social and economic evils of a 
land oligopoly” is a public use under the Fifth Amendment despite the fact that 
in certain instances, property was essentially being transferred from one citizen 
to another for private use.60 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A. The Kelo Decision 
The Kelo case was originally heard in the New London Superior Court, 
which approved half of the takings, and held the other half unconstitutional, 
causing both parties to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut.61  Subsequently, the Connecticut Supreme Court approved all of 
the takings, reasoning they were valid because of the state’s municipal 
development statute.62  The Connecticut Supreme Court also held that 
economic development was a public use.63  This decision was appealed, and 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the petitioners’ Fifth 
Amendment claims.64 
 
 58. See infra pp. 20-24 for a thorough discussion outlining the reasoning behind the 
deference afforded to the legislatures by the Supreme Court when the legislature makes a “public 
use” determination. 
 59. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232. (“Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the 
right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.  For the power of eminent 
domain is merely the means to the end. . . . Once the object is within the authority of Congress, 
the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine.  Here one of the means 
chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of the area.  Appellants argue that this 
makes the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of another businessman.  But the 
means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the public 
purpose has been established.” (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). 
 60. Id. at 241-42. 
 61. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660 (2005). 
 62. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 (2005) (The development statute states that “permitting 
and assisting municipalities to acquire and improve unified land and water areas and to acquire 
and improve or demolish vacated commercial plants for industrial and business purposes and, in 
distressed municipalities, to lend funds to businesses and industries within a project area in 
accordance with such planning objectives are public uses and purposes for which public moneys 
may be expended; and that the necessity in the public interest for the provisions of this chapter is 
hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination.”). 
 63. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. 
 64. See id. at 2658. 
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B. The Majority Opinion 
The Kelo case presented the Court with the opportunity to decide whether 
the City of New London’s proposed economic development plan, and 
subsequent use of its eminent domain power, qualified as a constitutional 
“taking” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.65  Justice Stevens 
authored the Court’s majority opinion.66  The opinion began with a brief 
introduction into the meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.67  
Justice Stevens saw two clear categories of eminent domain cases in which the 
law was unambiguous.68 
Justice Stevens first noted it was well settled law that the government 
could not take the property of one individual and transfer it solely to another 
individual even if compensation was paid.69  It was clear no entity can take a 
citizen’s land to provide a private benefit to an individual.70  The majority also 
noted the government could not use its eminent domain power “under the mere 
pretext” of a public use.71  The Kelo case, however, did not fit into either of 
these categories, as the City of New London had a legitimate economic plan 
for the area and that plan was adopted for no particular individual.72 
By way of contrast, the majority opinion noted it was equally well settled 
law that the government could take an individual’s property and open it for 
general public use such as a road or a park.73  The Kelo case, likewise, did not 
fit into this judicial category.74  Rather, the Kelo case was decided solely on 
whether the plan for New London constituted a “public purpose.”75 
The Court has given a broad interpretation to the term “public purpose.”76  
The rationale behind this interpretation was that a bright line, narrow 
interpretation of this term would be unworkable as a judicial standard because 
society and its needs are fluid, and thus no consistency could exist.77  
Consequently, legislatures have been granted wide latitude by the courts to 
decide what actually constituted a “public purpose.”78  The majority opinion 
then went on to explain recent decisions which illustrated the Court’s adoption 
 
 65. Id. at 2665. 
 66. Id. at 2658. 
 67. Id. at 2662. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 2662. 
 75. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 2664. 
 78. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] IMMINENT CHANGE 457 
of the broader definition.79  The opinion cited Berman v. Parker,80 in which 
the Supreme Court refused to examine an individual eminent domain 
challenge.81  The Court reasoned that in order for a development plan to work, 
the government or agency must be able to plan the area as a whole.82  In the 
unanimous decision, great deference was granted to the legislature to plan 
redevelopment projects, and the Court reiterated its view that the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment should be interpreted broadly.83 
The majority opinion subsequently cited Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff,84 which reaffirmed the deference given to the legislature to develop 
land use projects.85  The fact that land was in some cases transferred directly 
from one individual to another did not affect the outcome of the case.86  The 
Court noted that “it is only the takings purpose, and not its mechanics” that is 
relevant for the determination of public use.87  The Court reasoned that the 
legislature’s goal of eliminating the “social and economic evils of land 
oligopoly” was indeed a public use within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment.88 
With this background and precedent, the majority opinion proceeded to 
apply the developed law to the situation in New London.  The opinion 
conceded that the city of New London was not faced with a “need to remove 
blight,” but nonetheless the majority believed the poor economic situation 
entitled the legislature’s decision to judicial deference as had occurred in both 
Berman and Midkiff.89  Citing a detailed economic plan, careful legislative 
reflection throughout the process, and the decision in Berman, the majority 
chose to make the ruling based on the developmental plan as a whole, rather 
than on each individual claim.90  In this light, the majority ultimately rejected 
the petitioner’s Fifth Amendment argument and held that the plan did qualify 
as a public purpose.91 
In reaching this decision, the majority refuted a number of the petitioners’ 
arguments.92  The petitioners’ first argument was that in no case can economic 
 
 79. Id. at 2663-64. 
 80. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 81. Id. at 28. 
 82. Id. at 34. 
 83. Id. at 33 (“The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive.”). 
 84. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 85. Id. at 241-42. 
 86. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663 (2005). 
 87. Id. at 2664. 
 88. Id. (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241-42). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 2665. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665, 2667. 
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development qualify as a public use.93  The majority dismissed this contention, 
stating that it was supported by neither “precedent nor logic.”94  The opinion 
proclaimed that it was impossible to discern a difference between economic 
development and other kinds of public uses.95  Economic development as a 
public purpose was consistent with the broad interpretation of the Takings 
Clause recognized by the Court throughout its recent history.96 
The majority opinion continued by refuting petitoners’ notion that 
economic developments “blur[] the boundary between public and private 
takings.”97  The Court reasoned that often times a public purpose benefits 
private individuals and that the petitioners’ same argument was already heard 
and denied in Berman.98  The majority cited numerous cases in which the 
public good or public purpose goes hand-in-hand with a benefit for private 
parties.99 
Additionally, the Court refused to rule on petitioners’ contention that after 
this ruling nothing would stand in the way of a city taking a citizen’s land and 
giving it to another citizen solely to produce more tax dollars.100  The Court’s 
rationale was that if such hypotheticals arose, they will be confronted in due 
time.101  The majority felt no need to rule on a case that was not before 
them.102 
Petitioners’ final argument which the majority addressed was the notion 
that the Court should adopt a “reasonable certainty” requirement that the 
proclaimed public benefits will be realized.103  The Court refused to adopt such 
a standard because the majority reasoned it would represent a significant break 
from past precedent.104  The Court had previously declined to engage in 
“empirical debates” over legislative plans, and the majority saw no need to 
change that approach.105  Likewise, the Court reasoned that if it were required 
to engage in such empirical debates, it would take extraordinary amounts of 
time, which would create a significant barrier to numerous potential 
development plans.106  The Court refused to “second guess” a legislature’s 
 
 93. Id. at 2665. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 2666. 
 98. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)). 
 99. See id. (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422 
(1992); Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003)). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 2667. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 2668. 
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determination as to what property needed to be condemned in order to see the 
development plan come to fruition.107 
Despite ruling against the petitioners, the Court concluded the opinion with 
an invitation for state governments and officials to further define their eminent 
domain powers.108  The Court held that the opinion placed no limits or 
restrictions on a state’s ability to create stricter requirements for the takings 
power different than the “federal baseline.”109  The Court noted that many 
states already had stricter requirements either through their constitutions or 
eminent domain statutes.110  The majority conceded that the use of eminent 
domain for economic development is a matter for “public debate,” but 
attempted to distance themselves from this debate as they acknowledged that 
the Court’s only responsibility was to determine if a city’s economic 
development plan is a “public use” within the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.111 
C. Concurring Opinion 
Justice Kennedy authored the concurring opinion.112  In his determination, 
a taking is constitutionally valid so long as the taking is “rationally related to a 
conceivable public purpose.”113  Justice Kennedy continued by comparing the 
deferential standard pronounced in other Fifth Amendment Takings cases to 
that of the rational basis test used by the Court in Due Process cases.114  He 
tempered this analogy, however, by noting that any takings which benefit 
particular individuals “with only incidental or pretextual public benefits” are 
not valid within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and must be renounced 
by the Court.115  Justice Kennedy declared the proper determination of a public 
taking was whether the proposed public purpose is incidental to the benefits 
provided to individuals.  If so, then the taking should be declared invalid.116 
The examination of the proposed taking began with the presumption that 
the government’s plans were rational.117  The assumption by the Court should 
be that the plans of a government will serve a public purpose.118  Justice 
Kennedy continued by examining the Kelo facts, citing testimony, 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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documentary evidence, and economic statistics relied on by the trial court to 
show that the public benefits in the instant case are more than merely 
incidental.119  He disputed the idea that the plan was conceived with the 
intention to benefit a single private entity.120 
The concurring opinion subsequently addressed the petitioners’ argument 
that the Court should adopt a “per se rule” to invalidate takings justified 
through economic development.121  Justice Kennedy found no merit to this 
argument because such a broad rule would hurt the efficiency of certain 
development projects intended to benefit the public.122  However, it is 
noteworthy that the opinion does suggest that certain takings may require a 
stricter standard than that of Midkiff and Berman so that the Court can ensure 
the constitutional qualifications are met.123  Justice Kennedy, however, does 
not provide specifics on what certain situations may call for the heightened 
standard.124 
D. The O’Connor Dissent 
Justice O’Connor authored the first dissent.125  Justice O’Connor noted that 
a great principle of our system is that property cannot be taken from person A 
and given to person B.  The people would not entrust a government with the 
ability to do this.126  The dissent concluded that the Kelo decision has 
“abandon[ed]” this governmental limitation.127  As a result, “all private 
property” was in danger of this fate under the vague notion of economic 
development.128  The only qualification was that the land must be put to a more 
 
 119. See id. (“The trial court considered testimony from government officials and corporate 
officers; documentary evidence of communications between these parties; respondents’ 
awareness of New London’s depressed economic condition and evidence corroborating the 
validity of this concern; the substantial commitment of public funds by the State to the 
development project before most of the private beneficiaries were known; evidence that 
respondents reviewed a variety of development plans and chose a private developer from a group 
of applicants rather than picking out a particular transferee beforehand; and the fact that the other 
private beneficiaries of the project are still unknown because the office space proposed to be built 
has not yet been rented.”). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 122. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2670. 
 123. See id. (citing Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 549-50 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 126. Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671. 
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lucrative use.129  Post Kelo, no line can be drawn between what constitutes a 
private taking and what constitutes a public taking.130 
The dissent next addressed the Fifth Amendment and its limitations.131  
The Justices relied on the text of the Fifth Amendment for their discussion.132  
There are two inherent limitations on the power of eminent domain in the 
United States.133  The first is that “the taking must be for a public use and [the 
second is that] just compensation must be paid to the owner.”134  These 
limitations protect individuals against an unjust sovereign.135  In particular, the 
public use qualification establishes the “very scope of the eminent domain 
power.”136 
The dissent conceded that the Court has given great deference to legislative 
determinations on public projects, but the dissenting Justices acknowledge that 
the Court must maintain its duty to uphold the Constitution.137  As a result, it is 
up to the Court to decide if a public taking is truly public or if it is a private 
taking.138  This duty cannot be simply disregarded.139 
The dissent subsequently explained the three types of takings cases that 
have been recognized by the Court.140  It was acknowledged that the Court is 
guided by stare decisis, and in particular, its holdings in Berman and Midkiff, 
but distinguishes those cases from the immediate set of facts in Kelo.141  In 
both Berman and Midkiff, there was a tangible harm being inflicted upon those 
communities.142  In Berman, poverty created an area in Washington D.C. 
which became blighted, and in Midkiff, the real estate market was distorted 
because ownership of the land was so concentrated.143  The use of eminent 
domain in those respective cases “directly achieved a public benefit,” and it 
was irrelevant that the land was placed in private hands.144  No such 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  The Fifth Amendment provides that “private 
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 132. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[W]e begin with the 
unremarkable presumption that every word in the document has independent meaning . . . .”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. (quoting Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003)). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 2673. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (“It is well established that . . . the question [of] what is a 
public use is a judicial one.”). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 2674. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O’ Connor, J., dissenting). 
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circumstance exist the Kelo case.145  The petitioners’ homes were neither 
blighted nor contributing to any “social harm.”146  The public benefits that the 
majority believes the economic development will contribute to, things such as 
increased taxes and jobs, are entirely incidental.147  The dissent felt the 
majority had unexplainably broadened the scope of “public use” because it had 
abandoned the harmful property use precedent of Berman and Midkiff.148  This 
new standard allows the government to take land at will because “any lawful 
use of real private property can be said to generate some incidental benefit to 
the public.”149  The public use limitation essentially loses all of its meaning.150 
The dissent criticized the majority because the holding provides no 
direction or standard on how the Court is to examine future public taking 
questions.151  The majority matter of factly concluded that the facts will be 
examined when they are provided to the Court, but no specifics were given as 
to what the Justices should look for to determine if a true public taking has 
occurred within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.152  The dissenting 
Justices were also troubled because in economic development takings, the 
private benefits and incidental public benefits are “merged and mutually 
reinforcing.”153  Despite the true motives of the government, incidental public 
benefits will always occur if the land is put into private individuals’ hands, and 
as a result, an argument can always be made that the use is serving a public 
purpose.154 
In addition, the dissenting Justices found nothing unique about the 
particular facts of the Kelo case.155  The dissent did not find it significant that 
there were detailed development plans, or that there were many legislative 
studies trying to determine the exact amount of incidental public benefits.156  
The facts were not of any legal consequence, and there was nothing in the 
majority’s opinion to suggest what level of detail was needed or how much 
revenue or jobs must be created in order for development plans in future cases 
to reach the significance they seemed to reach in the Kelo case.157  The dissent 
concluded by noting that the majority’s suggestion of reliance on state 
 
 145. Id. at 2674-75. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 148. See id. (“In moving away from our decisions sanctioning the condemnation of harmful 
property use, the Court today significantly expands the meaning of public use.”). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Kelo, 125 S. Ct  at 2673. 
 151. Id. at 2675. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. at 2676. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676. 
 157. Id.. 
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governments to limit economic development takings was “an abdication of our 
responsibility.”158 
E. The Thomas Dissent 
Justice Thomas authored the second dissent.159  He was adamant that the 
Court abandoned the text of the Constitution in order to reach its holding.160  
He argued that the Constitution allows a government to take an individual’s 
property only if the government plans to control the land or if the land can be 
used by the public.161  Justice Thomas qualified his reading of the Constitution 
with a thorough documentation of the history and meaning of such words as 
“use,”162 “public use,”163 and “general welfare.”164 
Justice Thomas continued in his critique of the holding by laying out the 
history of the Court’s “Public Use Clause jurisprudence.”165  He contended 
that the Court has made two distinct mistakes throughout its recent history in 
this legal area.166  The first of these errors was the “adopt[ion of] the ‘public 
purpose’ interpretation of the clause,” while the second was “in cases deferring 
to legislatures’ judgments regarding what constitutes a valid public 
purpose.”167  The genesis of the former concept originates in dictum in 
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley168 and the latter from United States v. 
 
 158. Id. at 2677. 
 159. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 160. See id. at 2678 (“If such economic development takings are for a public purpose, any 
taking is, and the Court has erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution . . . .”). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  The definition of “use” is “the act 
of employing any thing to any purpose.”  Justice Thomas does not understand how a government 
could give land to a private person or entity and claim that the public was using the land, 
regardless of any benefits bestowed upon the public.  He concedes there may be broader 
definitions for “use,” but does not find them in the text of the Constitution. Id. 
 163. See id.  “Public use” must mean “the government or its citizens as a whole must actually 
‘employ’ the taken property.” Id. 
 164. See id.  If the Founding Fathers had wished to grant such broad powers with the Takings 
Clause, they would have used a word such as “general welfare” as they had in other parts of the 
Constitution.  This can only seem to mean that the Framers had a narrow view of government’s 
power under the Takings clause. Id. 
 165. See id. at 2682 (Thomas, C., dissenting). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).  The issue in Bradley was whether land could be taken under 
eminent domain for the construction of an irrigation ditch. Id. at 161.  The Court declared the 
taking was a public use because “[t]o irrigate and thus to bring into possible cultivation these 
large masses of otherwise worthless lands would seem to be a public purpose and a matter of 
public interest, not confined to landowners, or even to any one section of the state.” Id. 
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Gettysburg Electric Railroad Co.169  He opined that the Court incorporated 
these two concepts into its lines of reasoning in public use analysis with no 
apparent authority, but previous dictum.170  He concluded that it was from 
“these two misguided lines of precedent” that the Court was able to reach its 
decision in both the Berman and Midkiff cases.171 
IV.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS 
The defeat of individual property rights advocates in the Kelo case has 
caused the Supreme Court to come under criticism.172  The criticism has 
originated from various entities,173 but the message seems to be that the Kelo 
decision has effectively robbed the Fifth Amendment of its public use 
requirement.174  This barrage of criticism, while not completely without merit, 
is better placed on the potential effects of the decision rather than the legal 
analysis used to reach it.  Despite the large public backlash, the Kelo decision 
was not an abdication of duty by the Supreme Court as the dissent claimed.175  
In fact, the Court thoroughly examined and applied the years of legal precedent 
before it in reaching its decision.176  If anything, the Supreme Court could be 
criticized for simply applying the precedents without weighing the potential 
effects of its decision.  The Kelo decision was not the result of a sudden 
ideological shift in the Court, but rather the final result of eminent domain 
decisions which over time have demonstrated the Supreme Court’s willingness 
to defer to legislative determinations.177 
Ironically, in spite of the apparent setback to individual property rights in 
the United States, the Kelo decision can provide property rights advocates just 
 
 169. 160 U.S. 668 (1896).  The issue in Gettysburg was whether the government had the 
power to take land in order to build memorials on the former war site. Id. at 679. 
 170. Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2684. 
 171. Id. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 172. See generally Fuhrmeister, supra note 6. 
 173. In November, the United States House of Representatives voted 376 to 38 to pass an act 
which threatened to cut off federal funding to states that seized homes for private commercial use 
as a form of economic development.  The legislation is currently in the Senate and it is known as 
the Private Property Protection Act.  See Warren Richey, Eminent Domain in State Hands, 
CINCINNATI POST, Dec. 15, 2005, available at http:/news.cincypost.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ 
article?AID=/20051215/NEWS01/512150362. 
 174. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 175. Id. at 2677. 
 176. See infra pp. 20-24. 
 177. See Charles Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument 
for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491 (2006) and Paul 
W. Tschetter, Kelo v. New London: A Divided Court Affirms the Rational Basis Standard of 
Review in Evaluating Local Determinations of ‘Public Use.’  51 S.D. L. REV. 193 (2006) for the 
proposition tht the Kelo case was decided correctly as a matter of law, but contrast with Orlando 
E. Delogu, Kelo v. City of New London—Wrongly Decided and a Missed Opportunity for 
Principled Line Drawing with Respect to Eminent Domain Takings, 58 ME. L. REV. 17 (2006). 
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the ammunition needed to stem the erosion.  It must not be overlooked that the 
Supreme Court essentially requested that the state legislatures solve the 
eminent domain dilemma themselves.178  This apparent invitation, combined 
with the extraordinary publicity of this issue, can pave the way for restrictive 
eminent domain legislation across the country.  Currently Alabama, Delaware, 
Texas, and Ohio have used the outcry against the Kelo decision to enact 
restrictive legislation, and Missouri needs to take this opportunity to follow 
suit in order to limit the scope of eminent domain powers.179 
A. Limited Scope of Review for Kelo 
The position of the Supreme Court is summed up by Justice Stevens in one 
phrase.  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, notes that in regards to 
eminent domain decisions, the Supreme Court has a “longstanding policy of 
deference to legislative judgments in this field.”180  The Kelo decision is the 
apex of that deferential policy.  The dissent attempts to distinguish the past 
cases of Berman and Midkiff, on which the majority heavily relies, from the 
Kelo facts, but it simply holds no weight because to rule against the legislature 
in this case would require the Court to turn its back on years of legislative 
deference.181 
The notion of legislative deference in eminent domain decisions begins 
with the concept of a state exercising its police powers.  Police powers allow a 
sovereign “to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, 
and quiet of all persons.”182  The extent and scope of these powers has no 
readily defined limit in United States jurisprudence, and as such, there is a 
narrow role for judicial review when a state acts under its police powers.183  
 
 178. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 (“In affirming the City’s authority to take petitioners’ 
properties, we do not minimize the hardship that condemnations may entail, notwithstanding the 
payment of just compensation.  We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State 
from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”). 
 179. See ALA CODE § 11-47-170; DEL CODE ANN TIT. 29, § 9505 (2005); S.B. 167, 126th 
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (Vernon 2005). 
 180. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663. 
 181. See id. at 2668 (“Because over a century of our case law interpreting that provision 
dictates an affirmative answer to that question, we may not grant petitioners the relief that they 
seek.”). 
 182. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985); see also City of Columbus v. 
Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 439 (2002) (holding that public safety falls 
within the police power); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (holding that 
control of advertising is within the police power); Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 21 
(2000) (holding that the establishment of regulatory or licensing schemes are within the police 
power); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.470, 485 (1996) (holding that the regulation of 
compensation through tort remedies was within the police power). 
 183. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“An attempt to define [police powers] 
reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts.  The definition 
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Additionally, it is the legislature’s role, not the judiciary’s, to determine the 
location, method, and purpose of the application of these broad powers.184 
The Supreme Court has previously recognized the power of eminent 
domain to be “equated with the police power,”185 and thus the public use 
requirement embedded within the power of eminent domain is “coterminous 
with the scope of the sovereign’s police powers.”186  Consequently, whenever 
a state chooses to use eminent domain, it is subject only to minimal review by 
a court.187  In fact, the Supreme Court wrote in Midkiff that “it will not 
substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes a 
public [purpose] ‘unless the [purpose] be palpably without reasonable 
foundation.’”188  Essentially, the only question left to the judiciary after Midkiff 
was to determine whether the legislature had reasonable grounds to claim a 
proposed project could benefit the public. 
The dissent claims that the Kelo case is an “issue of first impression,”189 
and while this might be true with regard to a proposed taking for the purpose of 
economic development, it was of no bearing on the outcome of this decision.  
Under the scope of review, as laid out by Berman and Midkiff, the Supreme 
Court had to ask and answer one question in the case.  So even though the 
majority claims that the case “turn[ed] on the question whether the City’s 
development plan serves a ‘public purpose,’”190 it is better stated that the case 
actually turned on whether the proposed economic development could 
reasonably benefit the public. 
The controlling precedents dictated the Supreme Court’s scope of review.  
The only determination relative to the outcome of the case was the 
government’s ability to show that the proposed construction plan and 
subsequent economic development were reasonably going to benefit the 
public.  Once that determination was made, the Supreme Court theoretically 
reached the limits of its scope of review because of the deference afforded to 
the legislature.  This is exactly how the majority proceeded and decided the 
case.191  The dissent authored by Justice O’Connor, curiously chides the 
 
is essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government, 
purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition.”). 
 184. See id.  (“In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the 
public needs to be served by social legislation . . . . This principle admits of no exception merely 
because the power of eminent domain is involved.”). 
 185. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S 229, 240 (1984). 
 186. See id. 
 187. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. 
 188. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R.R. Co., 160 U.S. 
668, 680 (1896)). 
 189. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2673 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 190. See id. at 2663. 
 191. See supra, note 177. 
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majority for placing “special emphasis” on the particular facts of the case and 
concludes that “none has legal significance.”192  However, when deciding 
whether a development plan and its proposed economic benefits are reasonably 
going to benefit the public, one has no choice but to look at particular facts of a 
case to make this determination.  Consequently, the majority examined the 
condition of proposed condemned land, the economy of the surrounding area, 
the scope of the development plan, and its projected benefits before concluding 
that the plan itself was reasonable.193  It was these particular facts, along with 
the scope of review from Berman and Midkiff, which not only had legal 
significance, but were dispositive in reaching the majority’s decision. 
The dissent claims that the “Court’s holdings in Berman and Midkiff were 
true to the principle underlying the Public Use Clause,”194 thus implying that 
Kelo somehow was not.  This characterization of Kelo is completely 
inaccurate.  The outcomes of both the Berman and Midkiff decisions were not 
dictated by the specific intended public purpose of each case.  Rather, those 
takings were held constitutional because the Court recognized its limited scope 
of review and decided that it should not substitute its own judgment for that of 
the legislature when determining a public use.  This was the same principled 
analysis applied to the Kelo case.195 
The dissent stresses the fact that in both of the prior cases, a harmful use 
was eliminated.196  However, neither of the prior holdings ever specified that 
the elimination of a harmful use was necessary or required to make a taking 
under eminent domain constitutional.  The fact that in the Kelo case there was 
no claim that the city was removing a harmful use was immaterial.  The crucial 
determination in those cases was that the Court would be hesitant to question 
the legislature’s determination as to what constitutes a public purpose.197  The 
surviving principle of the Public Use Clause from Berman and Midkiff was 
judicial deference to the legislature.  Therefore, even though the Kelo case 
presented a different public purpose, it was irrelevant “because Berman and 
Midkiff dictate[d] the outcome of [the Kelo] case based not on their specific 
public purposes, but on their jurisprudential attitude.”198 
The Supreme Court did not abdicate its duty as the dissent claimed.199  It 
applied a century of case law in order to reach its decision.200  Under the scope 
 
 192. See id. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor believes the findings of the 
legislature to be nothing but mere “prognostications.” Id. 
 193. See id. at 2665. 
 194. See id. at 2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 195. See Cohen, supra note 177. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663. 
 198. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 
(No. 04-108). 
 199. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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of review outlined in Midkiff and Berman for eminent domain, the question to 
be answered was whether the stated public purpose, economic development, 
would reasonably benefit the public.  The majority found it to be, and thus 
found in favor of New London after determining that economic development 
was a public use. 
B. Lingering Questions 
The Kelo case was decided correctly based on precedent, but it is very easy 
to understand why the public reacted so negatively to the outcome.201  
Seemingly, all property is subject to eminent domain after the Kelo decision.202  
The majority, while adhering to its past cases, did not address the many 
concerns of the dissenting Justices.  In her dissent, Justice O’Connor notes that 
“[n]othing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-
Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”203  
Justice Stevens merely dismisses these possibilities by noting that if such case 
ever were to arise that the Court would deal with it in the future.204  The 
majority has no satisfactory answer to these hypotheticals, and it is because of 
this lack of answers that restrictive eminent domain legislation needs to be 
passed to provide assurances to individual property rights advocates.  Exactly 
what are the limits whenever a state decides to exercise its eminent domain 
powers against its citizens?  An individual knows that they will be paid a 
compensation, but that appears to be the only bright line rule after Kelo.  The 
fear that the government will begin to take peoples’ homes and give the land to 
any business with a development plan is overstated, but it exists because of the 
broadness of the public use requirement and the Court’s deferential attitude 
towards the legislature. 
Another question left unanswered in the wake of the decision is what 
exactly is the difference between a public taking and private taking?205  
Seemingly, there is no difference after Kelo.  The majority notes that the 
creation of new jobs and additional tax revenue benefited the public in Kelo; 
therefore, the taking was not a purely private taking so as to make it 
 
 200. Id. at 2668. 
 201. Different public opinion polls show public opposition has ranged from anywhere from 
seventy percent to ninety percent in the wake of the Kelo decision.  See Richey, supra note 173. 
 202. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 203. See id. at 2676. 
 204. See id. at 2667 (“[Hypotheticals] do not warrant the crafting of an artificial restriction on 
the concept of public use.”). 
 205. See id. at 2671 (“To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits 
resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render economic development 
takings ‘public use’ is to wash out any distinction between private and public use of 
property . . . .”). 
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unconstitutional.206  That distinction, however, creates more questions than it 
answers.  What type of property use could not be said to create some kind of 
ancillary benefit for the public?207  Is there a certain amount of tax revenue 
which needs to be created?  Essentially, if a government takes property from 
one private citizen and transfers it to another, will it ever fail the public 
purpose test as outlined in Kelo so long as some benefit is realized by the 
public?208  Consequently, if no transfer ever fails the public purpose test, what 
restraints are there on the government’s power of eminent domain except that 
compensation is paid to the displaced landowners?209  The majority’s decision 
does not address these concerns, and as a result many individual citizens fear 
that their property could be the future target of an eminent domain action if 
restrictive legislation is not passed. 
C. The Kelo Compromise: The Majority’s Decision to Place Power in the 
State’s Hands 
Despite the majority’s holding, it is not entirely clear that they truly 
believed in what they were writing.  In fact, the majority may very well have 
been troubled by those lingering questions discussed in the previous section.  
As noted earlier, the holding was based on sound legal principles and stare 
decisis, but those two notions are of little comfort to individual property rights 
advocates across the country.  Likewise, it appears that the majority was 
somewhat skeptical with the result despite their principled decision. 
First, the opinion goes out of its way to acknowledge the consternation that 
those individuals who lose their homes may feel.210  The majority clearly 
sympathizes with an individual who will lose a home to a business.  Secondly, 
the opinion readily acknowledges that the “wisdom and necessity” of 
condemnations for the purpose of economic development would still be 
important topics of public debate, thus revealing their trepidation as to the 
concept of economic development takings.211  However, the most telling sign 
of the majority’s uneasiness with their own decision was its invitation to the 
states to restrict eminent domain powers as they saw fit.212  The opinion even 
provides examples of some restrictive legislation already in place at the time of 
 
 206. Id. at 2665. 
 207. Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 208. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id. at 2668 (“In affirming the City’s authority to take petitioner’s properties, we do 
not minimize the hardship that condemnations may entail, notwithstanding the payment of just 
compensation.”). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
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the Court’s decision.213  None of these acknowledgements or examples given 
by the majority was necessary in the opinion, but obviously they felt inclined 
to include the words.  In fact, the entire final paragraph of the opinion has no 
legal relevance to the holding.  It appears that the majority was requesting 
legislative action to better define the scope of eminent domain because they 
were not comfortable with the state of eminent domain law after Kelo. 
The majority may have felt trapped between their skepticism of the 
wisdom of economic development takings and the legal precedents before 
them.  They chose to apply the legal precedents to the Kelo facts, but allowed 
some of their skepticism to show in the end.  Had Berman or Midkiff never 
occurred, the decision of Kelo may have been different, but it is hard to 
speculate.  Ultimately, had the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners 
from Fort Trumbull, the Court would have been turning its back on one 
hundred years of precedent.  Rather than create chaos, the majority made a 
decision to adhere to the principles established in Berman and Midkiff but still 
invited the states to define eminent domain as they wished. 
Ironically, despite the defeat in the Kelo case, property rights advocates 
may end up winning in the long run.  Instead of sulking over the Supreme 
Court’s decision, property rights advocates need to take advantage of the 
opportunity the Court gave them.  The majority’s opinion pointed out that the 
power and control of eminent domain lies in the hands of the states.214  
Consequently, it is up to them to curb the erosion of individual property rights 
in the United States.  The Supreme Court has invited the states to enact 
restrictive legislation, and Alabama, Delaware, Texas, and Ohio have taken up 
their offer.215  The State of Missouri needs to follow the lead of these proactive 
states to preserve the property rights of its citizens. 
D. States’ Response to Kelo216 
With the power to restrict eminent domain squarely in the hands of state 
legislatures, the effects of Kelo can be mitigated.  If proper legislation is 
enacted, concerned citizens will not have to fear that their home will be the 
next home taken for economic development purposes as those homes were in 
the Kelo case.  Four states have enacted legislation restricting the use of 
 
 213. See id.  In California, a city may take land for economic development purposes only in 
blighted areas. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 33030-33037 (West 1997). 
 214. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668. 
 215. See ALA CODE § 11-47-170; DEL CODE ANN. TIT. 29, § 9505 (2005); S.B. 167, 126th 
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (Vernon 2005). 
 216. See Timothy Sandefur, The “Backlash” So Far: Will Citizens Get Meaningful Eminent 
Domain Reform?, A.L.I.-American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education (Jan. 5-7, 2006) 
for the proposition that reform measures taken in Alabama, Texas, Delaware, and Ohio still 
contain loopholes for abuse of eminent domain. 
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eminent domain,217 and while none of these amendments is exactly the same, 
the effects of these amendments are.  The measures passed by these states 
range from complete bans on property takings for economic development to 
enhanced regulatory processes requiring greater community involvement 
earlier in the process.218  Likewise, numerous other states have legislation 
pending that should be voted on in the upcoming year.219 
1. Alabama220 
Alabama has banned all economic development takings as a result of the 
Kelo decision.221  The legislation in Alabama is very specific and the language 
of the amendment is seemingly lifted straight from the Kelo holding.222  The 
Alabama State Senate passed the restrictive legislation during a special session 
in 2005 immediately following the controversial holding.223  The legislation 
does not provide a precise definition of what constitutes a public use, but it 
does create specific bright line standards for what cannot be considered a 
public use.  Specifically, the Alabama amendment provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a municipality . . . may not 
condemn property for the purposes of private retail, office, commercial, 
industrial, or residential development; or primarily for enhancement of tax 
revenue; or for transfer to a person, nongovernmental entity, public-private 
partnership, corporation, or other business entity.  Provided, however, the 
provisions of this subsection shall not apply to the use of eminent domain by 
any municipality . . . based upon a finding of blight . . . but just compensation, 
in all cases, shall continue to be first made to the owner.224 
The Alabama legislature has essentially rendered the Kelo holding 
meaningless in its state.  By passing the ban on economic development takings, 
the power to transfer private properties to other private individuals exists only 
upon a finding of blight.225  This is the same exception which was held 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Richey, supra note 173. 
 219. Id.; see also National Conference, supra note 10 (At least eleven other states have 
legislation pending on eminent domain restrictions.). 
 220. Alabama had at least six bills introduced into either the House of Representatives or the 
Senate which failed before their restrictive eminent domain legislation was enacted.  National 
Conference, supra note 10. 
 221. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. ALA. CODE § 11-47-170 (2005). 
 225. The Alabama legislature has found that blight: 
[C]onstitute[s] a serious and growing problem, injurious to the public health, safety, 
morals, and welfare of the residents of the state; that the existence of such areas 
contribute[s] substantially and increasingly to the spread of disease and crime, constitutes 
an economic and social liability imposing onerous burdens which decrease the tax base 
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constitutional in the Berman case.226  This amendment gives the government 
sufficient power to ensure the growth of communities by removing blight, but 
it does not does allow such broad powers as the Kelo case.  Economic 
development is no longer a viable public use in Alabama. 
2. Delaware 
The Delaware restrictive eminent domain legislation reads as follows: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the acquisition of 
real property through the exercise of eminent domain by any agency shall be 
undertaken, and the property used, only for the purposes of a recognized public 
use as described at least 6 months in advance of the institution of 
condemnation proceedings: (a) in a certified planning document; (b) at a public 
hearing held specifically to address the acquisition; or (c) in a published report 
of the acquiring agency.227 
Delaware’s legislation is slightly different than the legislation passed in 
Alabama.  As opposed to delineating specific projects eminent domain 
proceedings cannot be used for, Delaware simply restricts eminent domain 
acquisitions to those public uses which have already been recognized in the 
state.  The effects, however, are the same.  Delaware has previously recognized 
that property can be transferred to another private party upon a showing of 
blight, but not merely for economic development.228  The restrictive eminent 
domain powers in Delaware are basically the same as those in Alabama.  The 
 
and reduce tax revenues, substantially impairs or arrests sound growth, retards the 
provision of housing accommodations . . . [and] are focal centers of disease, promote[s] 
juvenile delinquency, and consume[s] an excessive proportion of public revenues because 
of . . . police, fire, accident, [and] hospitalization . . . . 
§ 11-99-1 (2005) 
 226. See supra text accompanying notes 43-51. 
 227. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9505 (2005). 
 228. In Delaware a “blighted area” means: 
[T]hat portion of a municipality or community which is found and determined to be a 
social or economic liability to such municipality or community because of any of the 
following conditions: 
a. The generality of buildings used as dwellings . . . are substandard . . . as to be 
conducive to unwholesome living; 
b. The discontinuance of the use of any building . . . ; 
c. Unimproved vacant land, which has remained so for a period of 10 years . . . ; 
d. Areas (including slum areas) with buildings or improvements which by reason of 
dilapidation . . . are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the 
municipality or community; 
e. A growing or total lack of proper utilization of areas . . . resulting in a stagnant and 
unproductive condition of land potentially useful and valuable for contributing to and 
serving the public health, safety and welfare . . . . 
tit. 31, § 4501 (2005). 
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state can transfer property through eminent domain to another private party 
only for blight.229 
This restrictive legislation also goes a step further than the Alabama 
legislation because it increases the regulatory process required of entities using 
eminent domain.  Any time eminent domain power is to be used, the 
government must present the public with a certified plan and must hold a 
public hearing at least six months before any condemnations can proceed.230  
At the very least an extra burden has been placed on the government in order to 
grant citizens more time to prepare for their dislocation.  However, citizens 
may use this time to ask additional questions or challenge any legal issues 
which may present themselves during the process.  In short, Delaware goes 
beyond simply restricting eminent domain capabilities.  Delaware’s additional 
regulatory requirements place more power in the hands of the ordinary citizen 
affected by eminent domain than before the Kelo decision. 
3. Texas231 
The Texas legislature took the same broad approach that the Alabama 
legislature did, a complete ban on all economic development takings.  In a 
similar fashion, the amendment banning economic development takings 
seemed to borrow language straight from the Kelo decision.  Specifically the 
amendment reads: 
A governmental or private entity may not take private property through the use 
of eminent domain if the taking: 
(1)  confers a private benefit on a particular private party through the use of the 
property; 
(2)  is for a public use that is merely a pretext to confer a private benefit on a 
particular private party; or 
(3)  is for economic development purposes, unless the economic development 
is a secondary purpose resulting from municipal community development or 
municipal urban renewal activities to eliminate an existing affirmative harm on 
society from slum or blighted areas . . . .232 
A notable difference in the Texas legislation is the restriction of eminent 
domain authority if the public use is declared to be a pretext to confer a benefit 
on a private party.  This restriction adds one more step to the judicial process 
regarding eminent domain.  The courts must now determine if any pretext 
 
 229. Id. 
 230. See supra text accompanying note 227. 
 231. Texas failed to pass four bills in either the House of Representatives or Senate prior to 
enacting the current restrictive eminent domain legislation.  See National Conference, supra note 
10. 
 232. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (Vernon 2005). 
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exists for any proposed public use.  This additional step is one more hurdle the 
government must overcome to exercise eminent domain power, and thus one 
more safeguard for individual property owners.  The courts in Texas now have 
a duty to truly examine the decisions and motives of the legislature and are not 
bound by the precedents of legislative deference as the Supreme Court was in 
Kelo. 
Texas does not take the additional regulatory steps that Delaware did, but 
instead has given its courts broader powers to review proposed eminent 
domain takings.  Private property in Texas will not be transferred to other 
private citizens for economic development.  The state can transfer property 
through eminent domain to another private party only for blight.233 
4. Ohio 
The Ohio legislature has taken a more cautious approach to its eminent 
domain legislation.  The legislation creates a moratorium on economic 
development takings in order to study the effects of eminent domain in Ohio.  
The legislation declares: 
[U]ntil December 31, 2006, a moratorium on the use of eminent domain by 
any entity of the state government or any political subdivision of the state to 
take, without the owner’s consent, private property that is in an unblighted area 
when the primary purpose for the taking is economic development that will 
ultimately result in ownership of the property being vested in another private 
person, to create the Legislative Task Force to Study Eminent Domain and Its 
Use and Application in the State, and to declare an emergency.234 
Rather than pass legislation amid all the controversy of the Kelo decision, the Ohio 
legislature will look at the current state of the law of eminent domain in Ohio.  
This moratorium may not satisfy individual property rights advocates, but the 
language of the declaration does effectively outlaw Kelo-type takings for at least a 
year. 
V.  A CALL FOR EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM IN MISSOURI 
Currently in Missouri, eminent domain is a well publicized topic.  On July 
12, 2005, three weeks after the Kelo ruling, Sunset Hills officials decided to 
allow eighty-five residents’ homes and small businesses to be condemned 
 
 233. Texas defines a “blighted area” as: 
[A]n area that is not a slum area, but that, because of deteriorating buildings, structures, or 
other improvements; defective or inadequate streets, street layout, or accessibility; 
unsanitary conditions; or other hazardous conditions, adversely affects the public health, 
safety, morals, or welfare of the municipality and its residents, substantially retards the 
provision of a sound and healthful housing environment, or results in an economic or 
social liability to the municipality. 
§ 374.003. 
 234. S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005). 
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through eminent domain to make way for a shopping mall and offices.235  
Likewise, the city of Arnold has expressed an interest in razing thirty homes 
and fifteen small businesses, including the Arnold VFW, for a Lowe’s Home 
Improvement Store, and a strip mall because its need for more revenues.236  
Municipalities are using the Kelo decision to push forward economic 
development plans at the expense of its citizens, and the Missouri legislature 
needs to enact restrictive legislation to preserve its citizens’ individual property 
rights. 
If one were to take a quick glance at the Missouri Constitution, it may 
appear that the possibility of an economic development taking is remote in 
Missouri.  In fact, it could be argued that Kelo will have no effect on the 
eminent domain proceedings because Missouri already has restrictive measures 
in the law.237  This contention, however, fails to recognize that the current 
regulations in place do not completely foreclose economic development 
takings.  In order to shut these loopholes the legislature needs to adopt certain 
measures recommended by the Missouri Eminent Domain Task Force in order 
to sharpen the definitions of key words in the statutes such as “blighted area” 
and “public use.”238  If these steps are taken, Missouri citizens will have more 
certainty that their homes will not be razed for pure economic development 
takings because the scope of eminent domain will be narrowed to precise and 
clear statutory language. 
A. Current Law in Missouri Does Not Effectively Eliminate Economic 
Development Takings 
In order to know where to strengthen the law, one must know where the 
law is weakest.  The current eminent domain law in Missouri is outlined in its 
Constitution.239  It states that an individual’s private property will not be taken 
for a private use.240  However, this private use prohibition is not without 
 
 235. See Dana Berliner, Kelo Revisited: Eminent Domain Should Not be Used for Private 
Development, CAPITALISM MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2005, http://www.capmag.com/articlePrint.asp? 
ID=4419. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See MISSOURI EMINENT DOMAIN TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2005) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]. 
 238. Id. 
 239. MO. CONST. art. I, § 28. 
 240. The Missouri Constitution provides that: 
[P]rivate property shall not be taken for private use with or without compensation, unless 
by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and except for drains and 
ditches across the lands of others for agricultural and sanitary purposes, in the manner 
prescribed by law; and that when an attempt is made to take private property for a use 
alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be public shall be 
judicially determined without regard to any legislative declaration that the use is public. 
Id. 
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exception.241  Missouri’s Constitution also provides that a city or county may 
create ordinances which allow for the redevelopment of blighted areas.242  The 
determination of what property is blighted is a matter for the legislature to 
decide.243  In effect, Missouri law prohibits the use of eminent domain to 
acquire land to transfer to a private party unless there is a finding of blight.244 
This blight exception is not unusual.  As was discussed earlier, a “blight 
exception” exists in each of those states which have already passed restrictive 
eminent domain legislation.  Accordingly, it would seem that in Missouri a 
taking solely for economic development purposes is already outlawed because 
there would be no finding of blight.  Consequently, it follows that Missouri 
does not need to enact any further legislation because restrictive legislation is 
already in place to protect against economic development takings. 
However, this thought process is flawed.  It fails to recognize the 
possibility that economic development takings could occur under the auspices 
of the blight exception as the law stands today.  This possibility exists because 
of the broad definition of blight in Missouri and past case history interpreting 
its meaning. 
Blight is defined as: 
[The] portion of the city within which the legislative authority of such 
city determines that by reason of age, obsolescence, inadequate or 
outmoded design or physical deterioration have become economic and 
social liabilities, and that such conditions are conducive to ill health, 
transmission of disease, crime or inability to pay reasonable taxes.245 
The concerning portion of this definition is that part of the statute which speaks 
in broad terms of an economic liability.  An economic liability simply implies 
that that portion of the city is not economically advantageous.  Does that mean 
the land is not being used to its fullest economic potential or that the land is 
 
 241. Id. art. 6, § 28. 
 242. The Missouri Constitution provides that: 
Laws may be enacted, and any city or county operating under a constitutional charter may 
enact ordinances, providing for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction, redevelopment 
and rehabilitation of blighted, substandard or insanitary areas, and for recreational and 
other facilities incidental or appurtenant thereto, and for taking or permitting the taking, 
by eminent domain, of property for such purposes, and when so taken the fee simple title 
to the property shall vest in the owner, who may sell or otherwise dispose of the property 
subject to such restrictions as may be deemed in the public interest. 
Id. 
 243. Tierney v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth. of Kansas City, 742 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Mo. 
1987). 
 244. See generally State ex rel. Dalton v. Land Clearance Auth., 270 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1954); 
see also State ex rel. Atkinson v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth. of St. Louis, 517 S.W.2d 36 
(Mo. 1975) (sustaining the urban redevelopment law as it currently stands); Annbar Assoc. v. 
West Side Redev. Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1965). 
 245. MO. ANN. STAT. § 353.020 (West 2005). 
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serving no economic purpose at all?  The statutory language gives no direction, 
and thus it is solely in the government’s power to give meaning to the statute 
by its actions.  It is not hard to imagine a situation where a solely economic 
development taking can be justified under the blight exception. 
For example, suppose that there is an area of land which contains low to 
middle income housing.  The housing is structurally sound, but it is quite old.  
There is a moderate crime rate, but it is not out of the ordinary.  This land is 
also in a municipality struggling for revenue.  Looking for ways to stimulate 
the municipality, the city council conducts a study which determines that a 
shopping mall would provide ten times the revenue housing does.  It is further 
determined that this additional revenue would allow the municipality to make a 
host of improvements from increased police presence in order to lower the 
crime rate to higher educational funding to create better schools.  The city now 
crafts a well developed plan to raze the houses in order to build a mall.246  
Currently, very little stops the city from using Missouri’s blight statutes to turn 
this land into a shopping mall simply for economic development. 
Consider that the determination of blight is a legislative determination.247  
After examining the blight statute, the city determines the area can be blighted 
because the area is outdated and consequently not reaching its potential in 
terms of tax revenue as compared to the shopping mall.248  The area can be 
considered an economic liability in terms of the statutory language.249  
Likewise, the existing conditions are more conducive to a higher crime rate 
than the proposed use would be.  Once that determination is made, courts 
cannot substitute their judgment unless the original decision is found to be 
unreasonable.250  It is highly unlikely a court would consider a lower crime 
rate and higher education funding unreasonable.  Once this area is deemed 
blighted, the city could accept contract proposals and eventually transfer the 
land to a private developer.251  In effect, it is plausible that a Missouri city 
could engineer an economic development taking similar to Kelo under current 
Missouri law despite the blight requirement. 
While this is only a hypothetical, Missouri courts have considered 
situations similar to these in the past and have held that land can be blighted 
 
 246. “An authority shall not recommend a plan to the governing body of the city until a 
general plan for the development of the city has been prepared.” Id. § 100.400 (2005).  In the 
hypothetical, the city could also create an Urban Redevlopment Corporation under MO. ANN. 
STAT § 353.110 to acquire land through eminent domain.  See TASK FORCE, supra note 237, at 
19. 
 247. See Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 150. 
 248. See TASK FORCE, supra note 237. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 150. 
 251. Allright Mo., Inc. v. Civic Plaza Redev. Corp., 538 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Mo. 1976). 
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simply because of economic under utilization.252  In Tierney v. Planned 
Industrial Expansion Authority253 (“PIEA”) the City Counsel of Kansas City 
designated land as blighted because of economic underutilization and 
subsequently developed a reconstruction plan.254  PIEA eventually accepted a 
contract proposal from a developer for the land.255  The owners of some of 
these properties in the redevelopment plan contended that these designations 
were unreasonable so as to have the court overturn the blight designation.256  
The court, however, deferred to the legislative determination of blight.257  
Likewise, the owners argued that the city’s concept of economic under 
utilization was too broad and dangerous.258 The court did not find this 
argument persuasive, instead ruling that because “urban land is scarce,” and 
because there is a problem assembling large enough tracts of land, “industrial 
development is a proper public purpose.”259 
The idea of blighting land because of economic under utilization is 
synonymous with taking land for economic development.  It appears that 
Missouri law is relatively close to the federal baseline of eminent domain 
established in Kelo.  Likewise, it would mean that all land is theoretically 
subject to eminent domain takings because economic under utilization is a 
valid reason to blight property.  Based on case history and the current statutes, 
the law in Missouri needs to be strengthened so that the possibility of 
economic development takings cannot continue under the blight exception. 
B. The Missouri Eminent Domain Task Force’s Role 
In response to the Kelo decision, Governor Matt Blunt created the Missouri 
Eminent Domain Task Force (“Task Force”) to study the eminent domain law 
 
 252. See Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 151; Crestwood Commons Redev. Corp., v. 66 Drive-In, 
Inc., 812 S.W.2d 903, 910 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). 
 253. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d 146. 
 254. Id. at 150. 
 255. Id.  The PIEA accepted a contract proposal from the K-A Company which was different 
than the reconstruction plan originally approved by City Plan Commission three months earlier. 
See id. 
 256. Id.  Tierney’s land was not originally designated as blighted.  His land became part of 
the redevelopment project after the PIEA accepted an altered plan from the K-A Company.  See 
id. 
 257. See id. (“[The Council’s] authority controls unless its decision is shown to be so arbitrary 
and unreasonable as to amount to an abuse of legislative process.”). 
 258. Id. at 151.  Tierney raised arguments very similar to those which the dissent in Kelo 
raised.  He suggested that economic under utilization was “so broad as to confer upon the 
legislative authority and the PIEA the unlimited discretion to take one person’s property for the 
benefit of another” because “almost all land could be put to a higher and better use.” See id. 
 259. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 151. 
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in the state.260  In particular, the Task Force was directed to “analyze current 
state . . . laws governing eminent domain and recommend any changes that 
would enhance the effectiveness of these laws;” “[t]o develop a definition of 
‘public use’ that allows state and local government to use eminent domain 
when there is a clear an direct public purpose while at the same time ensuring 
that individual property rights are preserved;” and “[t]o develop criteria to be 
applied by state and local governments when the use of eminent domain is 
being proposed.”261  The Task Force presented its recommendations to 
Governor Matt Blunt on December 30, 2005.262  In total, the Task Force 
recommended eighteen proposals so as to improve eminent domain law in 
Missouri.263  If a combination of these recommendations is adopted in 
Missouri, citizens’ property rights will be preserved despite the Kelo ruling 
because the government will have defined substantive limitations to the 
legislature’s ability to exercise eminent domain to transfer property to other 
private parties. 
C. Course of Action for Missouri Eminent Domain Law 
1. Reforming the Definition of Blight 
The first recommendation is to sharpen the definition of blight.  As 
discussed above, it is plausible to see how the blight exception could be 
manipulated.264  Likewise, the Task Force noted that “the current definition of 
blight has been abused by condemning authorities by making determinations of 
blight” in unreasonable areas.265  There needs to be an objective standard or 
some additional factors added to the definition of blight so as to create a better 
guideline to ensure more consistency in legislative determinations of blight.266  
This new definition should also explicitly state that economic under utilization 
is not a proper reason to declare a property blighted.267 
 
 260. The Task Force met a total of ten times prior to issuing its final report.  During their 
commission, they heard from over fifty witnesses providing eminent domain testimony. See TASK 
FORCE, supra note 237, at 6. 
 261. See id. 
 262. The recommendations are broken down into three categories.  The first category is about 
redefining the scope of eminent domain; the second category is about improving the procedure 
required for exercising eminent domain; and the third category provides penalties to condemning 
authorities if they attempt to abuse the process.  See id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. See discussion supra text Part V. 
 265. See TASK FORCE, supra note 237, at 25. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
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A possible model of reform for Missouri is to incorporate the legislative 
findings of Alabama into its blight statute.268  A key portion of the legislative 
findings determined that blight “necessitate excessive and disproportionate 
expenditures of public funds for crime prevention and punishment, public 
health and safety, fire and accident protection and other public services and 
facilities.”269  This type of statute forces the entity seeking a blight designation 
to at least show that the particular area is costing the state more in preventative 
measures than the average municipality.  Adjustments have to be made for 
population and geographic size difference between municipalities, but it would 
at least create a statewide baseline and a more objective frame of reference for 
determining blight. 
2. Define “Public Use” 
The second recommendation for Missouri is to define the term “public 
use” as it will apply to eminent domain.  One of the goals given to the Task 
Force was to develop a definition which allows municipalities to use eminent 
domain, but also one which protects property rights.270  The definition which 
the Task Force agreed upon is: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, neither this state 
nor any political subdivision . . . shall use eminent domain unless it is 
necessary for a public use.  The term “public use” shall only mean the 
possession, occupation, and enjoyment of the land by the general public, or by 
public agencies; or the use of land for the creation or functioning of public 
utilities or common carriers; or the acquisition of abandoned or blighted 
property. 
The public benefits of economic development, including an increase in tax 
base, tax revenues, employment, or general economic health, standing alone, 
shall not constitute a public use.271 
This statute should be enacted because it encompasses the law of eminent 
domain in Missouri into a single statute.  Likewise, it clearly and precisely lays 
out what can constitute a public use and what cannot.  The intent of the 
legislature is clear, and this statute is open to very little interpretation.  The 
statute also accomplishes Governor Blunt’s goal because it is clear when a 
municipality may use eminent domain, yet it also restricts the possibility that 
private property will be transferred to another private entity for economic 
development, thus preserving individual property rights. 
Missouri should adopt both the sharpened blight definition and the 
proposed public use definition.  Together these statutes redefine the scope of 
 
 268. See supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text. 
 269. Id. 
 270. See TASK FORCE, supra note 237, at 6. 
 271. Id. at 22. 
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eminent domain law in Missouri.  The questions of exactly when and where a 
municipality can exercise eminent domain will be largely answered because of 
the new definition of public use.  Likewise, individual property rights will be 
better protected with this recommendation than under the current law in 
Missouri because at no time will property be transferred to another private 
party without empirical data confirming an area is blighted or because of 
economic under utilization.  This empirical data will be discovered using 
objective standards which diminish the chance of potential abuse and provides 
definite standards which will lead to more consistent results in the 
determination of blight. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Kelo decision has brought eminent domain to the forefront of 
American political and social debate.  No matter a person’s views on the 
decision, it is clear the Supreme Court applied the same legal principles 
established in Berman and Midkiff to the Kelo case.  The criticism of Kelo is 
not due to the decision itself, but in response to the “green light” given to cities 
and developers.  Because of Kelo, it is hard to see where a legislature’s 
authority to use eminent domain ends.  The only hard rule is that compensation 
must be paid.  The “public use” clause has evolved simply to be the public 
benefit clause which is satisfied if the public receives a boost in tax revenue or 
employment rates.  This is troubling because it means any property could 
theoretically be subject to eminent domain. 
The Supreme Court, however, apparently understood these concerns.  They 
have invited the states to enact restrictive legislation to narrow the scope of 
eminent domain powers.  Alabama, Delaware, Texas, and Ohio have 
effectively done just this.  Missouri needs to follow these leads by adopting 
portions of those laws into their own.  Missouri statutes and case law currently 
allow eminent domain takings such as Kelo to occur because of economic 
under utilization.  If Missouri adopts the recommendations of their Eminent 
Domain Task Force and tightens the definition of “blight” and defines “public 
use,” property rights advocates will not have to fear that their home will be the 
next taken for a shopping mall. 
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